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Notes & Comments
Assessment of Civil Monetary Penalties for Water
Pollution: A Proposal for Shifting the Burden of
Proof Regarding Damages
By Diane Price Taylor*
Introduction
In March 1974, almost 430 million gallons of raw sewage and un-
treated municipal wastes were dumped into San Francisco Bay and the
Pacific Ocean after the city of San Francisco shut down its four sewage
treatment plants for six days during a municipal employees strike. For
fourteen days, nearly 100 miles of shoreline were closed to the public
by a quarantine imposed by three separate health departments. Surfers
and others who came in contact with the polluted water suffered from
dysentary and other intestinal problems. An overpowering odor and
unsightly discoloration of the water lingered for days, marring the aes-
thetic beauty of the marine and urban environment. 1
Twenty years ago, such a polluting incident probably would have
evoked public outcry but little official action against the polluter. Not
only were there few, if any, effective enforcement devices provided for
under either federal or state water quality laws, but a concern with
"making the polluter pay" for the consequences of its actions was not
reflected in public policy. In recent years, however, there has been a
significant shift in public values regarding the environment. The tradi-
tional attitude that commercial and industrial interests are of primary
importance has given way to a recognition that the quality of life is
* A.B., 1975, University of California, Berkeley. Member, Third Year Class.
1. Opening Brief of City and County of San Francisco as Appellant and Cross-Appel-
lant at 1-18, Reply Brief of Plaintiff on Appeal of Defendant and Cross-Defendants and
Opening Brief of Plaintiff on Plaintiffs Cross-Appeal at 3-13, California v. City and County
of San Francisco, No. 72059 (Super. Ct. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 44127 (Cal. Ct. App.,
1st Dist. May 12, 1978); N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1974, at 38, col. 3. See also San Francisco
Civil Serv. Ass'n v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 46, 47-48, 544 P.2d 1331, 1332, 127 Cal. Rptr.
131, 132-33 (1976). See note 8 infra.
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dependent on a healthy environment and that environmental interests
must be protected and promoted as well.2 Congress and the state legis-
latures have responded to this shift in values by enacting an assortment
of laws directed towards the preservation and enhancement of the nat-
ural environment, 3 and most of these laws now provide for stringent
enforcement devices when violations of their provisions occur.4
California, for example, has a water quality act5 which provides
for the judicial assessment and imposition of civil monetary penalties.6
The strict liability penalty provision 7 was invoked after the San Fran-
cisco sewage discharge incident when the San Francisco Regional
Water Quality Control Board brought an action against the city of San
Francisco to recover civil monetary penalties for the city's violation of
California's strict water pollution control laws.8 After a six day trial at
2. This attitudinal change has been well documented. See, e.g., W. ROSENBAUM, THE
POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN (1973); Broughton, Aesthetics and Environmental
Law. Decisions and Values, 7 LAND & WATER L. REv. 451 (1972); Galbraith, The Further
Dimensions, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 334 (R. Dorfman & N. Dorfman eds.
1972) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT]; Stone, Should Trees Have
Standing?-Toward Legal Rightsfor Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); Note,
The Burden of Proof in California Environmental Nuisance Cases, 9 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 679
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Environmental Nuisance Cases].
3. See, e.g., Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1976); Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1361-1407 (1976); Endangered Species Act of
1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West
Supp. 1977); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1971);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1977); Native Species Conservation
and Enhancement Act, CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 1750-1763 (West Supp. 1978); Califor-
nia Wild and Scenic River Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5093.50-.65 (West Supp. 1978);
California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1978); California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West
1977 & Supp. 1978); Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act, CAL. WATER CODE
13000-13998 (West 1971 & Supp. 1978).
4. See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1375-1377 (1976);
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1976); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§
1319-1322, 1342, 1344, 1365 (West Supp. 1977); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7413, 7414,
7419, 7420, 7477, 7523, 7524, 7525, 7545, 7572, 7603, 7604, 7607, 7618, 7621, 7622 (West
Supp. 1977); California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30803, 30805, 30808,
30820-30822 (West 1977); Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act, CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 13300-13361, 13385-13387 (West 1971 & Supp. 1978).
5. Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-13998
(West 1971 & Supp. 1978). See notes 53-77 & accompanying text infra.
6. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13350, 13385 (West 1971 & Supp. 1978). See notes 62-64,
75-76 & accompanying text infra. The term civil monetary "penalties" is somewhat of a
misnomer in that the primary purpose of these remedies is not to "penalize" the polluter, but
rather to deter pollution in the first place, and to compensate the government for damages if
the pollution does occur. See text accompanying notes 96-99 infra. However, because this is
the term most often used in referring to such an enforcement device, it will be used through-
out this Note.
7. CAL. WATER CODE § 13385 (West 1971 & Supp. 1978). See note 75 infra.
8. California v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 72059 (Super. Ct. 1977), appeal
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which several witnesses testified concerning the extent of damage
caused by the sewage discharge, a jury awarded the board $500,000, 9
the maximum allowable recovery under the penalty provision. The
judge, however, reduced the amount to $150,000 on the principal
ground that the award was "grossly excessive" in view of the harm
shown to be caused by the pollutant discharges.10 He commented that
the evidence did not show that fish had died, that birds and marine life
had been harmed, or that the State had incurred any clean-up costs."
The distressed board, noting that San Francisco's failure to operate its
sewage treatment plants resulted in the worst sewage pollution incident
in California's history, asked, "If this case is not worth the maximum
allowed by law, what case is?,12
This issue of assessing and imposing the appropriate amount of
civil monetary penalties for violation of water quality statutes is not
unique to California; it arises in many other states as well as at the
federal level because such penalties have come to constitute a key en-
forcement remedy in many pieces of environmental legislation.' 3 De-
pending on the particular statutory scheme, they may be assessed and
imposed by administrative agencies' 4 or by the courts,15 and the effi-
docketed, No. 44127 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist. May 12, 1978). San Francisco filed a cross-
complaint against the striking unions for indemnification and the unions thereafter peti-
tioned for a writ of mandate on the ground that the civil penalties sought to be collected
were punitive in nature and that therefore the city was immune from liability. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court rejected this claim in San Francisco Civil Serv. Ass'n v. Superior Court,
16 Cal. 3d 46, 544 P.2d 1331, 127 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1976), and remanded the case for judgment
on the merits.
9. See 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 930 (1977).
10. Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, voL III at 32 (Nov. 7, 1977); see 8 ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) 1384 (1978).
11. Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, vol. III at 30-31 (Nov. 7, 1977).
12. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, vol. II at 580 (Nov. 18, 1977).
13. See, ag., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a) (1976); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1319(d), 1321 (West Supp. 1977); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(b)
(West Supp. 1977); California Air Resources Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42401-
42402 (West Supp. 1974-1977); California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§
30820-30821 (West 1977); Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act, CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 13350, 13385 (West Supp. 1978). See also statutes compiled in notes 14-15, 76 infra.114. See, ag., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(b)(2)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 1977); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7420
(West Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-6b (West 1975); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-
521.2, 88-917 (1971 & Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1033(b) (Smith-Hurd
1977); N.Y. ENvm. CONSERV. LAW §§ 71-1707, -1725,-1941 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1977);
Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 6111.30 (Anderson 1977); ORE. REv. STAT. § 468.135 (1977);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.94.431, 90A8.144 (1975 & Supp. 1978).
15. See, ag., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (West Supp. 1977); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(b) (West Supp.
1977); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-314, 36-1864.01 (Supp. 1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 42403 (West Supp. 1974-1977); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13350, 13385-13386 (West
1971 & Supp. 1978); MIcH. CoM. LAWS ANN. §§ 323.10 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
115.071 sub. 3 (West Supp. 1977); N.Y. ENvr. CoNsERv. LAW §§ 71-1929, -2103 (McKin-
January 19791
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ciency and effectiveness of the penalties are determined to a large de-
gree by the method of assessment and imposition used.16
A major problem that results when the courts are delegated the
task of setting the amount of the penalty stems from the evidentiary
rules applicable to judicial proceedings. The parties must bear the bur-
ney 1973 & Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1274 (1973 & Supp. 1978); c/f FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 403.121 (West Supp. 1978) (providing for option of either administrative or judicial
imposition of civil penalties).
16. The relative advantages of administrative as opposed to judicial assessment and
imposition of civil monetary penalties often have been described by commentators. The
consensus appears to be that "[t]he main advantages of the judicially imposed penalty are
that it is more familiar to enforcement institutions and it is clearly constitutional, avoiding
some of the legal questions which might arise when an administrative agency performs tasks
of a legislative or judicial nature." Note, Environmental Protection and the Role of the Civil
Money Penalty: Some Practical and Legal Considerations, 4 ENVT'L AFF. 323, 335-36 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Role of the CivilMoney Penalty]. Underlying the adminstrative method
of imposing civil monetary penalties, on the other hand, are much more compelling and
tangible reasons. Such a method has been found to be particularly appropriate when the
following factors are present:
(a) a large volume of cases likely to be processed annually;
(b) the availability to the agency of more potent sanctions with the resulting likeli-
hood that civil money penalties will be used to moderate an otherwise too harsh
response;
(c) the importance to the enforcement scheme of speedy adjudications;
(d) the need for specialized knowledge and agency expertise in the resolution of dis-
puted issues;
(e) the relative rarity of issues of law (e.g., statutory interpretation) which require ju-
dicial resolution;
(f) the importance of greater consistency of outcome (particularly as to the penalties
imposed) which could result from agency, as opposed to district court, adjudications;
and
(g) the likelihood that an agency (or a group of agencies in combination) will establish
an impartial forum in which cases can be efficiently and fairly decided.
Recommendation 72-6, CivilMoney Penalties as a Sanction, 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND RE-
PORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 67, 69 (July 1, 1970 -
Dec. 31, 1972) (adopted Dec. 14, 1972). Factors (a) and (c)-(e) are especially present with
respect to environmental penalty provisions. The administrative assessment and imposition
of civil monetary penalties for violation of environmental statutes free overburdened courts
from resolving issues of small precedential value and allow the enforcing agency to utilize its
technical expertise and resources in determining, in a relatively speedy and inexpensive
manner, the most appropriate amount to be imposed on a violator in a particular case. See
Schachter, Some Criteriafor Evaluating State and LocalAir Pollution Control Laws, 14 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 583, 630-35 (1973); Note, The Illinois Environmental Protection Act
and the Power of anAdainistrative 4gency to Impose a Fine, 50 Cm. -KENT L. REV. 466,480
(1973); Role of the Civil Money Penalty, supra, at 334-37. See also 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINSTRA-
TIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.10, at 448 (1958); Goldschmid, An Evaluation f the Present and
Potential Use of Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, 2
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 896 (July 1, 1970-Dec. 31, 1972); Gellhorn, A dministrative Prescription and Imposi-
tion o/Penalties, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 265 (1970); Lawrence, Judicial Review of Variable Civil
Money Penaies, 46 U. CrN. L. REV. 373 (1977).
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den of proving the existence or nonexistence of the facts that are essen-
tial to their case. 17 Uncertainty often arises in judicial assessment
proceedings because it is unclear under the penalty statute exactly what
is necessary to be proved and by which party.
The judicial assessment and imposition of civil monetary penalties
under the federal Clean Water Act of 197718 is guided by a civil penalty
policy' 9 intended to facilitate the assessment of the appropriate amount
in individual cases. The burden of proving all the factors that establish
the appropriate amount is put on the government.20 Because quite
often the available evidence is insufficient to prove to the requisite de-
gree of certainty that a large penalty is appropriate, however, the pol-
luter has an advantage by this placement of the burden of proof.
California has no official policy nor statutory guidelines regarding
the burden of proof in an action brought for violation of its water qual-
ity control statute. Not only has this situation created a confusing state
of affairs when a case actually goes to trial, but it probably accounts to
a large degree for the fact that few penalty-assessment cases even reach
the courts. The enforcing agency is- more likely to settle for less than
the appropriate amount rather than risk a judicial award of a nominal
sum because of the uncertainties involved in presenting a legally suffi-
cient case.
For example, the San Francisco sewage discharge case 2' was the
first major judicial action to be brought under California Water Code
section 13385, the strict liability penalty provision. Because the section
specifies that civil penalties are "not to exceed ten thousand dollars for
each day" of violation, the court could fix the per diem penalty any-
where within the range of $0 to $10,000 once a violation was shown.
An extensively argued issue in the case concerned which party had the
burden of establishing the evidence from which the assessment could
be made. The court ultimately instructed the jury that "[t]he defendant
has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence all
the facts necessary to prove that the amount of civil penalties imposed
should be less than $10,000 per plant or point of discharge, per day
.... "22 Yet, although the city presented no defense, resting after the
board presented its case, the judge felt compelled to reduce the jury
award. The court explained after the verdict was rendered that the
state had the primary burden of establishing a prima facie case and the
17. See, eg., CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (West 1966).
18. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West Supp. 1977). See text accompanying note 31 infra.
19. EPA Civil Penalty Policy for Major Source Violators of Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act, 8 ENviR. REP. (BNA) 2011 (1978) [hereinafter cited as EPA Civil Penalty Pol-
icy]. See notes 78-95 & accompanying text infra.
20. See text accompanying note 93 infra.
21. See text accompanying notes 7-12 supra.
22. Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, vol. I at 266 (Sept. 21, 1977).
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burden shifted to the city only if it intended to show that the the dam-
age should not be the maximum amount. 23 Obviously, without legisla-
tive or precedential guidance, trial courts are unsure how to allocate the
burden of proof in penalty-assessment cases.
This uncertainty stems in large part from the failure of the courts
thus far to take a comprehensive look at the functions of the penalty
provisions of the water pollution statutes in California and to consider
these functions when assessing the civil monetary penalty. Whether the
enforcement provisions are intended to perform punishment, deter-
rence, or compensation functions bears on the factors courts must con-
sider when assessing the penalty.
This Note will discuss the origin, nature, and scope of the civil
monetary penalty provided for in California Water Code section 13385.
The Note concludes that effective water pollution enforcement will be
frustrated if the state is required to bear the burdens of proof concern-
ing the extent and value of damage to the environment resulting from
water pollution and concerning the amount of the penalty that will
serve to deter future pollution incidents. A proposal is offered whereby
a showing of a violation of the statute would give rise to a rebuttable
presumption that the maximum penalty of $10,000 per day per viola-
tion is the appropriate amount to deter future violations and, addition-
ally, to compensate for the unquantifiable harm caused to the
environment and society by the pollutant discharge. The burden would
then rest with the polluter to prove factors which would warrant reduc-
ing the statutory maximum. Under such a construction, the polluter
will be prevented from taking advantage of the difficulty inherent in
establishing the deterrence value of the civil penalty and in quantifying
damages for most water pollution incidents.
Statutory Background
Federal Legislation
Prior to 1972, there was no comprehensive national program for
water pollution control. The Refuse Act of 189924 and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1948,25 as amended,26 had largely
proven ineffective in controlling the quality of the nation's waters.
23. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, vol. III at 588, 590 (Nov. 18, 1977).
24. 33 U.S.C. §§ 407-418 (1976).
25. Ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
26. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), as amended by
Water 'Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, ch. 518, 70 Stat. 498; Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204; Water Quality
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903; Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246; Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84
Stat. 91.
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Even after the enactment of the Water Quality Act of 1965,27 which
made significant improvements in the federal program, the acts were
uncoordinated, limited in scope, vague, and unwieldly to enforce.28 In
response to these deficiencies, and with a renewed national commit-
ment to a clean environment, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act Amendments of 1972.29 The Clean Water Act of
1977,30 in turn, amended the 1972 Amendments and the federal water
quality statute is now referred to overall as the Clean Water Act.31
The 1972 Amendments declared that "it is the national goal that
the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by
1985."32 In furtherance of this goal, the federal program for water pol-
lution control was totally restructured.33 The 1972 Amendments sup-
plemented the 1965 Act's water quality standards with specific effluent
limitations,34 established a comprehensive national system of discharge
permits,35 and provided for a variety of new enforcement remedies, in-
cluding civil and criminal monetary penalties. 36
Under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES), the discharge of pollutants from any point source is unlaw-
ful unless it is in compliance with effluent limitations contained in a
permit.37 These permits are issued by the Environmental Protection
27. Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965).
28. See Water Pollution Control Legislation, 1971 (Oversight of Existing Program):
Hearings Before the House Comm on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Barry, The
Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution ControlAct: A Study
of the Difculty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MICH. L. Rrv. 1103 (1970); Ipsen &
Raisch, Enforcement Under the Federal Water Pollution ControlAct Amendments of 1972, 9
LAND & WATER L. REv. 369, 370-374 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ipsen & Raisch];
McThenia, An Examination of the Federal Water Pollution ControlAct Amendments of 1972,
30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 195, 198-202 (1973) [hereinafter cited as McThenia]; Comment,
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 14 B.C. INraus. & COM. L.
REv. 672, 674-77 (1973); Note, The Development of the California and Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Programs, 5 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 234 (1972).
29. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976)).
30. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376).
31. See 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1987 (1978).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).
33. See generally Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 28; McThenia, supra note 28; Comment,
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 14 B.C. INDus. & COM. L.
REV. 672 (1973).
34. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1328 (1976).
35. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1345 (1976).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1976). Congress first imposed civil monetary penalties under the
FWPCA in the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, when it provided for a maximum
penalty of $10,000 for the knowing discharge of oil. Water Quality Improvement Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 102, 84 Stat. 91. The 1972 amendments also provided for the
establishment of research and training programs, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252-1265 (1976), and grants
for construction of waste treatment facilities, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1293 (1976).
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976).
January 19791 CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES
Agency 38 (EPA) or by those states whose permit programs have been
approved by the EPA.39 If a permit holder violates the conditions and
limitations contained in its NPDES permit, the EPA may notify an ap-
proved state's enforcement agency of the violation and defer to action
taken under the state's own enforcement laws, or it must either issue a
compliance order or bring a civil action against the violator "for appro-
priate relief."4 The EPA may additionally commence a criminal ac-
tion, when the violation has been willful or negligent, 41 and seek a civil
penalty in an amount "not to exceed $10,000 per day" for each permit
or compliance order violation.42 Under the strict liability wording of
the civil-penalty section, neither negligence nor intent must be proven
to establish liability.
The drafters of the Clean Water Act intended that the states have
the primary responsibility of enforcing the Act and that most enforce-
ment actions will be brought under state law.43 Only states with EPA
approved permit programs, however, may initiate enforcement action
against permit violators. 4 Once a state's regulatory program has been
approved pursuant to a determination that adequate authority exists
under the state's laws to issue permits which meet the federal statutory
requirements 45 and regulatory guidelines,46 the operation of the federal
permit system is suspended in that state,47 although the state program
still is subject to EPA oversight.48
One requirement for approval of a state permit program is the
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
39. See notes 44-48 & accompanying text infra.
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a), (b) (1976).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1976).
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1976).
43. "The Committee again, however, notes that the authority of the Federal Govern-
ment should be used judiciously by the Administrator in those cases deserve [sic] Federal
action because of their national character, scope, or seriousness. The Committee intends the
great volume of enforcement action be brought by the State. It is clear that the Administra-
tor is not to establish an enforcement bureaucracy but rather to reserve his authority for the
cases of paramount interest." ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Div. OF THE CONG. RESEARCH
SERV. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONG., 93D CONG., IST SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTs OF 1972, voL 2 at 1482 (Comm. Print
1973) [hereinafter cited as A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972].
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1976).
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(I)-(9) (1976).
46. State Program Elements Necessary for Participation in the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System, 40 C.F.R. § 124 (1977).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1976).
48. The EPA retains the power to review and veto the issuance of any state permit and
to withdraw approval of the state permit program if it is not being adequately administered.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)-(h) (1976).
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adoption of adequate enforcement provisions.49 In addition to other
sanctions,50 a state must have the power to bring actions to collect civil
monetary penalties for the violation of any permit conditions, water
quality standards, rules, regulations, or orders of the state water pollu-
tion control agency.51 A maximum civil monetary penalty must be es-
tablished which is either "comparable" to the federal maximum of
$10,000, or adequate to constitute "an actual and substantial economic
deterrent to the actions for which [it is] assessed or levied. '5 2
California Legislation
By the time the 1972 Amendments to the federal Clean Water Act
were enacted, California's Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act
of 1969 s5 was already regarded as one of the nation's most comprehen-
sive water pollution control programs.5 4 In 1969, the California legisla-
ture rejected an earlier philosophy which held that waste disposal into
the state's waters was "an economic beneficial use." Instead, the
lawmakers embraced a policy that "all recognized categories of benefi-
cial uses of water require varying degrees of water quality for their
protection and this protection is directed largely against the effects of
waste disposal." 55
To further this policy, the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control
Act provided that any person who discharged or proposed to discharge
a waste would be required to report such discharge to one of nine Re-
gional Water Quality Control Boards located throughout the state.56
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7) (1976); 40 C.F.R. § 124.73 (1977).
50. The state must also be able to issue compliance orders, 40 C.F.R. § 124.73(a)
(1977); exercise emergency powers to immediately halt any imminently hazardous dis-
charges, 40 C.F.R. § 124.73(b) (1977); enter premises to inspect and investigate suspected
violations, 40 C.F.R. § 124.73(d) (1977); and criminally prosecute violations, 40 C.F.R.§
124.73(f)-(g) (1977). See general, Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 28, at 387-99. Although not
mandatory, the comment to 40 C.F.R. § 124.73 (1977) highly recommends that states adopt
three additional enforcement procedures: assessing violators for the costs of investigation
and inspection, assessing violators for clean-up costs incurred by the state, and compensat-
ing the state or directly aggrieved residents for any loss or destruction of wildlife, fish or
aquatic life, and other actual damages caused by the unauthorized discharge of pollutants.
See note 82 infra.
51. 40 C.F.R. § 124.73(e) (1977).
52. 40 C.F.R. § 124.73(h) (1977).
53. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 482, § 18, at 1051 (codified at CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-
13998 (West 1971 & Supp. 1978)).
54. See generally Robie, Water Pollution: An Affirmative Response by the Calfornia
Legi'ature, 1 PAC. LU. 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Robie]; Note, The Development ofthe
Caljfornia and Federal Water Pollution Control Programs, 5 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 234 (1972).
55. CALIFORNIA STATE WATER REsouRcEs CONTROL BOARD, RECOMMENDED
CHANGES IN WATER QuALrrY CONTROL, FINAL REPORT OF THE STUDY PANEL 26 (1969)
(emphasis added), quoted in Robie, supra note 54, at 11.
56. CAL. WATER CODE § 13260 (a) (West 1971). See general, Note, Water Quality
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They, in turn, would prescribe requirements as to the nature of the dis-
charge in relation to the conditions existing in the disposal area of re-
ceiving waters.57 These waste discharge requirements established the
standards with which the dischargers must comply.
In instances of violation or threats of violation of waste discharge
requirements, the state and regional boards were provided with several
administrative enforcement remedies. They could require the dis-
charger to submit a detailed time schedule for compliance,58 and, if
necessary, clean up the waste or abate its effects, or reimburse the state
for its clean-up and abatement costs if it failed to do So. 9 The boards
could also issue cease and desist orders which, if ignored, could be en-
forced through court actions brought by the Attorney General for in-
junctive relief.60
Such cease and desist orders, backed up by injunctive powers, also
had been provided for under earlier law but, standing alone, had failed
to deter continuing illegal discharge while injunction proceedings were
pending. 61 In order to remedy this defect and provide incentive for
prompt compliance with cease and desist orders, the Porter-Cologne
Water Quality Control Act included in the water quality boards' array
of enforcement remedies judicially-imposed civil monetary penalties of
an amount "not to exceed six thousand dollars ($6000) for each day" of
intentional or negligent violation.62
Initially, this penalty provision, section 13350, was to be resorted
to only when other administrative remedies had been ineffective and
only when a cease and desist order had been issued and violated. 63
Less than two years later, however, section 13350 was amended to al-
low for the recovery of civil monetary penalties when waste was inten-
tionally or negligently discharged in violation of any waste discharge
requirement or board order as well.64
Shortly after enactment of the 1972 federal amendments, Califor-
Control in Californiw A Regional Approach, 7 CAL. W.L. REv. 138 (1970); Note, Regional
Water Quality Control, 5 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 272 (1972).
57. CAL. WATER CODE § 13263(a) (West 1971).
58. CAL. WATER CODE § 13300 (West 1971).
59. CAL. WATER CODE § 13304 (West 1971).
60. CAL. WATER CODE § 13331 (West 1971).
61. Robie, supra note 54, at 23.
62. CAL. WATER CODE § 13350 (West 1971).
63. Legislative Committee Comment, CAL. WATER CODE § 13350 (West 1971). In-
deed, to date only two cases brought to recover the civil monetary remedies under § 13350
have been reported. See People v. Department of the Navy, 371 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Cal.
1973); People v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 30, 544 P.2d 1322, 127 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1976).
64. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 668, § 1, at 1322 (codified at CAL. WATER CODE § 13350(a)(2)
(West Supp. 1978)). The 1971 amendment also subjected the discharger of oil into the state's
waters to liability for civil monetary penalties, CAL. WATER CODE § 13350(a)(3) (West Supp.
1978), and attempted to clarify the nature of the monetary penalties by providing that they
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nia added Chapter 5.56S to the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control
Act. This chapter authorized the state to apply for EPA permission to
implement the provisions of the federal act 66 and it also ensured that
the state would retain control over water pollution matters within Cali-
fornia.67 When California's NPDES program was granted EPA ap-
proval, the first state program to receive it, Chapter 5.5 suspended the
operation of the federal act in the state, and the chapter now regulates
all point source discharges of pollutants into the navigable waters of
the United States within the jurisdiction of California.68
The broad scope of Chapter 5.5 did not necessitate much reorgani-
zation of the state's water quality control program as established by the
1969 Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act. As it was, the Cali-
fornia and federal statutory schemes were very similar; both utilized a
"are in addition to, and do not supersede or limit, any and all other remedies, civil or crimi-
nal," CAL. WATER CODE § 13350(d) (West Supp. 1978). The current statute provides:
(a) Any person who (1) intentionally or negligently violates any cease and
desist order hereafter issued, reissued, or amended by a regional board or the state
board, or (2) in violation of any waste discharge requirement or other order issued,
reissued, or amended by a regional board or the state board, intentionally or negli-
gently discharges waste or causes or permits waste to be deposited where it is dis-
charged into the waters of the state and creates a condition of pollution or
nuisance, or (3) causes or permits any oil or residuary product of petroleum to be
deposited in or on any of the waters of the state, except in accordance with waste
discharge requirements or other provisions of this division, may be liable civilly in
a sum of not to exceed six thousand dollars ($6,000) for each day in which such
violation or deposit occurs.
(b) The Attorney General, upon request of a regional board or the state
board, shall petition the superior court to impose, assess and recover such sums.
Except in the case of a violation of a cease and desist order, a regional board or the
state board shall make such request only after a hearing, with due notice of the
hearing given to all affected persons. In determining such amount, the court shall
take into consideration all relevant circumstances, including but not limited to, the
extent of harm caused by the violation, the nature and persistence of the violation,
the length of time over which the violation occurs and corrective action, if any,
taken by the discharger.
(c) The provisions of Articles 3 (commencing with Section 13330) and 6
(commencing with Section 13360) of this chapter shall apply to proceedings to im-
pose, assess and recover an amount pursuant to this article.
(d) Remedies under this section are in addition to, and do not supersede or
limit, any and all other remedies, civil or criminal.
CAL. WATER CODE § 13350 (West Supp. 1978).
65. Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 1256, § 1, at 2485 (codified at CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13370-
13389 (West Supp. 1978)).
66. See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
67. CAL. WATER CODE § 13370 (West Supp. 1978).
68. Chapter 5.5 directs that its provisions shall apply to actions required under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (now the Clean Water Act) and
shall prevail over other provisions of the state Water Code to the extent of any inconsistency.
CAL. WATER CODE § 13372 (West Supp. 1978). The Clean Water Act applies to all point
source discharges of pollutants into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1976).
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regulatory system whereby all discharges of pollutants were prohibited
unless express permission, conditioned on compliance with certain
standards, was granted to individual dischargers. For the most part,
California was able to pattern itself after the federal program by merely
adopting the Clean Water Act's definitions69 and guidelines70 when is-
suing waste discharge requirements. In fact, the term "waste discharge
requirements" as used throughout the Water Code is defined as
equivalent to the term "permits" as used in the federal act.71
However, the Clean Water Act did force the restructuring of the
enforcement mechanisms of the California program. As noted above,72
the Clean Water Act specifies that an approved state permit program
must provide for certain enforcement devices. Although California's
enforcement program already included most of these devices, 73 it fell
short of meeting this requirement in two important respects: it did not
provide for criminal sanctions, nor did its civil monetary penalties ap-
ply to a discharger without fault. Both deficiencies were corrected by
incorporating virtually unchanged the appropriate provisions of the
Clean Water Act in Chapter 5.5.74
Thus, section 1338575 of the California Water Code now provides
for a $10,000 per day maximum civil penalty for each violation of
waste discharge requirements or cease and desist orders resulting in the
69. CAL. WATER CODE § 13373 (West Supp. 1978).
70. CAL. WATER CODE § 13377 (West Supp. 1978). Any waste discharge requirements
must "ensure compliance with any appliable effluent limitations, water quality related efflu-
ent limitations, national standards of performance, toxic and pretreatment effluent stand-
ards, and any ocean discharge criteria." Id. Compare these standards with the more general
ones in the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act, CAL. WATER CODE § 13263(a) (West
1971): "The requirements shall implement relevant water quality control plans, . . . and
shall take into consideration the beneficial uses to be protected, the water quality objectives
reasonably required for that purpose, other waste discharges, the need to prevent nuisance,
and the provisions of Section 13241." CAL. WATER CODE § 13241 (West 1971) lists factors
to be considered in establishing water quality objectives. These include beneficial uses of
water, environmental characteristics of the water, and economic considerations.
71. CAL. WATER CODE § 13374 (West Supp. 1978).
72. See notes 49-52 & accompanying text supra.
73. See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
74. CAL. WATER CODE § 13387 (West Supp. 1978) is the counterpart to 33 U.S.C. §
1319(c) (1976), the federal criminal penalty provision, and CAL. WATER CODE § 13385
(West Supp. 1978) is the counterpart to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1976), the federal civil mone-
tary penalty provision. See notes 75-77 & accompanying text mifra.
75. CAL. WATER CODE § 13385 (West Supp. 1978) provides: "Any person who dis-
charges pollutants, except as permitted by waste discharge requirements, or who violates any
cease and desist order, prohibition, waste discharge requirement, effluent limitation, water
quality related effluent limitation, national standard of performance, pretreatment or toxic-
ity standard or who refuses to comply with the requirements adopted pursuant to Section
13382 shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each
day in which such discharge, violation, or refusal occurs. Funds collected shall be paid to
the State Water Pollution Cleanup and Abatement Account."
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illegal point source discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters of
the state, regardless of fault.76 Similarly, California Water Code sec-
tion 13387 7 provides for criminal penalties in the form ofjail sentences
and fines.
Present Civil Penalty Assessment Policy
Contrary to the other civil penalty provisions contained in the fed-
eral and California water quality acts,78 the civil monetary penalty pro-
76. CAL. WATER CODE § 13386(c) (West Supp. 1978) provides: "With respect to viola-
tion of waste discharge requirements or cease and desist orders, remedies under Section
13385 are in lieu of the monetary remedies provided for in Section 13350." The Porter-
Cologne Water Quality Control Act § 13350 civil monetary penalty still applies to inten-
tional or negligent non-point source discharges, discharges of pollutants into nonnavigable
waters and onto land, and discharges of oil. See CAL. WATER CODE § 13350 (West Supp.
1978).
Even though the civil monetary penalty need not have been exactly the same as that
established under the federal act, see text accompanying note 52 supra, there appears to have
been no discussion as to whether a greater or lesser monetary maximum, representing "an
actual and substantial economic deterrent," would have been preferable to the federal maxi-
mum of $10,000 per day of violation. Since the California legislature thought Chapter 5.5 to
be of sufficient importance to enact it as an urgency statute, perhaps it did not want federal
approval delayed while an EPA determination was made as to the meaning of "an actual
and substantial economic deterrent." In any event, twenty-three of the twenty-seven state
NPDES programs that have since been approved by the EPA also provide for civil penalties
in an amount not to exceed $10,000 per day of violation. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 25-8-608
(1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-54q(a) (West 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §
6005(b)(1) (Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-521.2 (Supp. 1978); HAw. REv. STAT. §
342.11(c) (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 1042(a) (Smith-Hurd 1977); IND. CODE §
13-7-13-1(a) (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-170d (Supp. 1977); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §
8-1416(a) (1974); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.10(1) (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
115.071(3) (West 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 204.076(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978); MoNT. REv.
CODES ANN. § 69.4823(1) (Supp. 1977); NEV. REv. STAT. § 445.331(1) (1973); N.Y. ENVIR.,
CONSERV. LAW § 71-1929(1) (McKinney Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-28-08(3)
(Supp. 1977); Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. §§ 6111.07,.09 (Page 1977); OR. REv. STAT. §
468.140(3)(b) (1977); S.C. CODE § 48-1-330 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1274(6) (Supp.
1978); VA. CODE § 62.1-44.32(a) (Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 147.21(2) (West 1974);
Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-901(a) (1977). The four remaining states provide for a maximum civil
penalty of $5,000 per day of violation. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-17-43(a) (Supp. 1978);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1508(1)(c) (Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143.215.6(1) (1978);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90A8.144 (Supp. 1977).
77. CAL. WATER CODE § 13387 (West Supp. 1978) provides that a willful or negligent
discharger of pollutants or violator of waste discharge requirements, water standards, or
cease and desist orders is subject to a fine of not more than $25,000 per day nor less than
$2,500 per day or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. The punishment for
subsequent convictions is a fine of not more than $50,000 per day or by imprisonment for
not more than two years or both. Any person who knowingly provides false information to
the water quality boards is punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment
for not more than six months or by both.
78. See, ag., 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(B), (j) (1976) (oil and hazardous substance liabil-
ity); CAL. WATER CODE § 13350(b) (West Supp. 1978).
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vision in each act that applies to permit and order violations without
fault79 does not list factors which must be considered in fixing the exact
amount of the penalty. At the federal level, the EPA has recently at-
tempted to provide some guidance in this matter by issuing a civil pen-
alty policy statement.80 By its own terms, however, the policy applies
only where the source has failed "to bring itself into initial compliance
with the requirements" of the Clean Water Act; it "does not apply to
violationsfollowing initial compliance or to violations of an intermittent
or transient kind, such as spills, violations of emission or discharge lim-
its through accidents or when attributable solely to the failure to ade-
quately operate or maintain pollution control equipment." 81 In
addition, although the policy is intended to be used by both federal and
state enforcement officials, it does not bind the states82 or the courts.
The preamble to the civil penalty policy enunciates "general prin-
ciples for determining appropriate penalties that the government will
seek in individual cases."'83 These principles are based primarily on
four considerations: "the harm done to public health or the environ-
ment; the economic benefit gained by the violator; the degree of recal-
citrance of the violator, and any unusual or extraordinary enforcement
costs thrust upon the public." 4
A methodology is set forth where, in a particular case, "appropri-
ate" sums are attributed to each of the four factors and then are added
together. From this figure is deducted the sum of the "appropriate"
amounts attributable to mitigating factors, such as government respon-
sibility or causes absolutely beyond the violator's control.8 5 The result
is "a 'minimum civil penalty' which would typically be presented to the
court as an appropriate penalty to be imposed" if settlement with the
defendant could not be reached.8 6
On the surface, this formula appears to be quantifiable and certain
enough to withstand most challenges going to the sufficiency of the
evidence in a judicial assessment proceeding. A closer look, however,
reveals that the "appropriate" amounts attributed to the various factors
are arrived at by rather imprecise methods.
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1976); CAL. WATER CODE § 13385 (West Supp. 1978).
80. EPA Civil Penalty Policy, supra note 19.
81. Id at 2013 (emphasis added).
82. The EPA has recently proposed extensive revisions to the substantive requirements
for approved state NPDES programs contained in 40 C.F.R. § 124 (1977). 43 Fed. Reg.
37,078 (1978). See notes 44-52 & accompanying text supra. One of the proposed revisions is
to require the states to adopt the federal civil penalty policy before their permits can be
approved. 43 Fed. Reg. 37,078, 37,083-84, 37,107-09.
83. EPA Civil Penalty Policy, supra note 19, at 2012.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2014.
86. Id. at 2013.
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For example, "estimated costs of environmental restoration,"
"traditional personal injury damage concepts," and "recreational val-
ues developed by various public agencies" are suggested as methods of
calculating "the sum appropriate to redress the harm or risk of harm to'
public health or the environment," 87 and yet such methods are often
viewed as resulting in no more than educated guesses.88 The EPA ac-
knowledges that, while harm to the environment occasioned by pollu-
tion incidents is certainly very real and serious, the figure arrived at
may be less than certain: "All pollutants introduced into the environ-
ment create some harm or risk, of course, and it will be difficult in
many cases to precisely quantify the harm or risk caused by the viola-
tion in question. The penalty amount attributable to such public harm
or risk will have to be determined on the facts of each specific case."8 9
Valuation of other factors comprising the penalty also involves el-
ements of uncertainty. Calculation of "the sum appropriate to remove
the economic benefit gained or to be gained from delayed compliance"
necessitates a valuation of the "economic benefits attributable to delay-
ing capital expenditures and avoiding operation and maintenance ex-
penses." 9  Some of the necessary calculation variables can be
determined objectively, such as investment tax credits, equity values,
and inflation rates, but other variables, such as capital costs and opera-
tion and maintenance expenses are not of such a nature as to allow
precise valuation.91 The calculation of sums attributed to the violator's
degree of recalcitrance, defiance, or indifference and to the mitigating
factors of governmental responsibility and uncontrollable causes92 may
also involve a great lack of specificity.
This discussion indicates that the EPA's civil penalty policy suffers
from the same defect that frustrated the State of California in the San
Francisco sewage discharge case. 93 The uncertainty inherent in calcu-
lating real, but unquantifiable damages to the environment and society
in order to arrive at an "appropriate civil monetary penalty" works to
the advantage of the polluter rather than to ensure that a significant
penalty is imposed. The policy, as well as California's rules of evi-
dence,94 implicitly places a heavy burden on the government to show
that the amounts attributed to the penalty factors are appropriate under
the circumstances; if the methods used to calculate these amounts are
too speculative and unsubstantiated, the polluter may avoid assessment
87. Id. at 2014-15.
88. See notes 124-46 & accompanying text infra.
89. EPA Civil Penalty Policy, supra note 19, at 2015.
90. Id.
91. Interview with economist, Sept. 22, 1978, Office of Water Enforcement, EPA.
92. EPA Civil Penalty Policy, supra note 19, at 2015-16.
93. See text accompanying notes 7-12 supra.
94. See note 17 & accompanying text supra.
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of the appropriate penalty by charging that the government has not
carried its burden of proof. Thus, allocating to the government the
burden of proving facts sufficient to support a particular penalty assess-
ment serves to frustrate the goals of both water pollution control legis-
lation generally and the civil monetary penalty specifically.
The EPA policy does recognize, however, that a penalty assess-
ment should be "appropriate" to a particular polluter and that "appro-
priateness" is determined by applying economic analysis and
principles. The policy's assessment methodology reflects an attempt to
remove economic incentives for delaying compliance with the Clean
Water Act provisions and to make the polluter bear the costs imposed
on the public and the environment as a result of its harmful polluting
activities. 95 The California courts would similarly benefit from a rec-
ognition that the assessment of penalties for violation of the state's
water quality control statute is largely an economic problem. A discus-
sion of the functions and economics of the civil monetary penalty in the
context of water pollution control, then, is necessary to show why it is
appropriate to place on the polluter the burden of proving facts suffi-
cient to warrant the assessment of a penalty less than the maximum
statutory armount of $10,000 per day, per violation.
95. The policy's preamble sets forth its goals: "While fulfilling its primary objective to
deter violations and encourage compliance, this policy has very significant additional justifi-
cations and benefits as well:
A. The Policy is fair.
1. in an ethical sense, because it will assure that violators of the law do not
economically benefit from their violation.
2. in an economic sense, because it will assure that violators do not gain an
economic advantage over others who incurred costs to obey the law, and
3. in a geographic sense, for it will assure that no area of the country can
offer lenient enforcement as an advantage to its industries or a lure to the indus-
tries of other areas.
B. The policy seeks to improve the operation of the market sector of our
economy by more fully imposing onto polluting firms costs otherwise thrust upon
the public. By internationalizing [sic] more of the social costs of producing goods
or services, it makes prices of goods or services better reflect the resources used in
their production, and allows the market system to better allocate resources.
C. The policy seeks to compensate the public for harm done to public health
or the environment, or for unusual or extraordinary enforcement expenses.
D. The policy seeks to make efficient use of government resources by remov-
ing economic incentives to violate environmental laws, thus maintaining high vol-
untary compliance rates. Because there are hundreds of thousands of pollution
sources, even a small decline in compliance rates brings major new requirements
for enforcement resources."
EPA Civil Penalty Policy, supra note 19, at 2012.
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The Functions of Civil Monetary Penalties in Relation to
Water Pollution
In general, water quality enforcement schemes seek to effect three
goals: deterrence, compensation and punishment. Various methods
have been devised merely to deter the potential polluter; these include
injunctive relief, administrative regulations, and inspection and moni-
toring procedures. Civil monetary penalties not only seek to deter pol-
lution, by discouraging the proscribed conduct, but they additionally
serve the purpose of compensating the State for unquantifiable dam-
ages to the environment.96 Criminal sanctions97 deter and compensate
(if fines are provided for), but alsopunish the intentional or negligent
polluter.98 While civil monetary penalties may incidently "punish"
polluters, this is not their primary purpose; theoretically, only criminal
penalties with their broader due process safeguards are designed and
intended to punish criminal conduct.99
Only monetary remedies have the potential to compensate for the
damage done. Of course, money cannot make the environment
"whole," but the funds collected can help alleviate the damage. In Cal-
ifornia, for example, all civil monetary penalties and one-half of all
criminal fines recovered in water pollution enforcement actions are de-
posited in a Water Pollution Cleanup and Abatement Account rather
than in the general Water Quality Control Fund. This account is used
only for cleaning up or abating the effects of water pollution.100
Civil monetary penalties, therefore, are primarily intended to pro-
mote the public policies of deterring polluting activities and compen-
sating for pollution damages. While the deterrent function may
operate either before or after a pollution violation, the compensatory
96. See, e.g., Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (W.D. Okla. 1976); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151, 1162-63, (D. Conn. 1975); United States
v. W.B. Enterprises, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 420, 422-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); People v. Superior
Court, 16 Cal. 3d 30, 37-39, 544 P.2d 1322, 1325-27, 127 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125-27 (1976); San
Francisco Civil Serv. Ass'n Local 400 v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 46,50-51, 544 P.2d 1331,
1334-35, 127 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134-35 (1976). But see People v. Department of the Navy, 371
F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Cal. 1973). See note 115 infra.
97. Eg., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1976); CAL. WATER CODE § 13387 (West Supp. 1978).
98. Note that waters of the state are legally "property" of the state and therefore pollu-
tion of such water literally constitutes property damage or a crime against property (e.g.
arson) when done with requisite mens rea.
99. Criminal sanctions have rarely been invoked to enforce pollution statutes. Civil
penalties are a more familiar device, they do not attach any moral culpability to the act, and
authorities do not have the burden of proving intent or negligence. See Charney, The Need
for Constitutional Protectionsfor Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. lRv. 478
(1974); Clark, Civil and Crininal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional
Analysis, 60 MiNN. L. REv. 379 (1976); Role of the Civil Money PenalZy, supra note 16, at
330-31.
100. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13440-13442 (West 1971).
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function comes into play only after such a discharge has occured. The
principles underlying both functions are rooted in economics, but be-
cause each function addresses different aspects of pollution control en-
forcement, their economic justifications are also different. One must
understand the economic bases which underlie these functions in order
to appreciate fully why the recovery of the maximum monetary penalty
by the government must not be rendered unobtainable or extremely
difficult owing to evidentiary obstacles.
The Economics of Deterrence
The deterrence function of civil penalties has been designed to
meet what many economists have recognized as "[t]he underlying eco-
nomic dilemma of environmental protection. . . it sometimes pays to
pollute."''1 1 Traditionally, air and water have been viewed as "free"
commodities. 10 2 Businesses, for example, must pay for labor and
materials, and these "costs" are included in the price of the finished
product or service. Air and water, on the other hand, create no such
private "costs" when they are utilized for private benefit. Such utiliza-
tion of "free" resources, however, does give rise to costs to society.
These societal costs, often called "externalities" because they are exter-
nal to actual out-of-pocket private costs, take many forms when private
interests choose to use a lake or river as a "free" dumping ground:
"higher taxes and sewer charges for citizens whose cities pick up indus-
try's share of the waste treatment tab; higher water bills for restoring
polluted water to drinkable quality; nauseating odor; direct injury to
property; and incalculable losses in health, recreation, and natural
beauty."' 1 3 Because these externalities are not included among the pri-
vate, or internal, costs, the public at large pays the price.
This situation results in a dysfunction in the economic system.
Ideally, all costs associated with services or the production of commod-
101. D. THOMPSON, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 8 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as THOMPSON]; see, e.g., F. ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON &
S. TAYLOR, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1977)
[hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES]; J.
DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES (1968); 0. HERFINDAHL & A. KNEESE, QUALITY
OF THE ENVIRONMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO SOME PROBLEMS IN USING LAND,
WATER, AND AIR (1965); J. KRUTILLA & A. FISHER, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL ENVI-
RONMENTS (1975); ECOLOGY AND ECONOMICS: CONTROLLING POLLUTION IN THE 70s (M.
Goldman ed. 1972); ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (E. Mills ed.
1975); ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 2; Note, Economic Incentivesfor Pollu-
tion .4batement. Applying Theory to Practice, 12 ARIz. L. REv. 511 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Economic Incentivesfor Pollution 4batement]; Role of the Civil Money Penaly, supra note
16.
102. The following discussion of the economics of pollution control is drawn largely
from the authorities cited in note 101 supra.
103. D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND 40 (1971).
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ities are included in the final price of such services or products. If they
are not, the service or product is underpriced and consumers will be
likely to purchase it over a comparable item that is more expensive
because it has included all its costs in the selling price. Thus, a busi-
ness may be rewarded with a competitive edge in the marketplace by
not bearing the cost of pollution-abatement devices or clean-up activi-
ties. As long as the external costs are not assessed to the polluting en-
tity, there is little economic incentive for it to spend money to abate its
pollution and thereby reduce the external "costs" to society.
Underlying most proposed solutions to the externality problem is
the concept of "internalization," that is, all the external costs associated
with pollution are borne by the business or governmental unit that pro-
duced them. Various methods of internalization have been proposed,
including tax credits, subsidies, direct taxation, effluent or discharge
fees, and regulation.104 Each method has advantages and disadvan-
tages, with the effluent fee generally considered to have the greatest
potential for effective internalization.105
An effluent fee, based on the quantity of nature of the discharge,
the abatement cost, or the degree of environmental damage, is paid by
the polluter directly to the state. As a result, the external costs created
by the discharge theoretically are internalized whether the polluter
chooses to abate or not-if the discharge continues, the effluent fee will
increase proportionately until all external costs are internalized; if the
polluter abates its discharge, the fee it must pay is reduced accordingly.
Despite its theoretical attractiveness, the effluent fee must overcome
certain technical and administrative difficulties before it can effectively
function as a viable pollution deterrent.10 6 Because there are not yet
104. For discussions of these and other internalization methods, see THOMPSON, supra
note 101, at 158-93; Oates & Baumol, The Instruments for Environmental Policy, in Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM 95 (E. Mills ed. 1975); Economic Incentives
for Pollution Abatement, supra note 101. See generally ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RE-
SOURCES POLICY DIV. OF THE CONG. RESEARCH SERV. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONG., 95TH
CONG., IST SESS., POLLUTION TAXES, EFFLUENT CHARGES, AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES
FOR POLLUTION CONTROL (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as POLLUTION TAXES, EF-
FLUENT CHARGES, AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR POLLUTION CONTROL].
105. See Kneese & Bower, Causing Offsite Costs to Be Reflected in Waste Disposal
Decisions, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 2, at 135; Kneese & Bower,
Standards, Charges, and Equity, in id. at 159.
106. Before the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 were enacted
in their final form, the Senate considered an amendment which would have imposed efflu-
ent charges on violators of the Act. After extensive debate on the advantages and disadvan-
tages of such an enforcement device, the amendment was rejected. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTs OF 1972, supra note 43, at 1316-
36. A noncompliance fee initially was provided for in the Senate Bill which eventually
became the Clean Water Act of 1977, but it also was rejected. The noncompliance fee is
premised on the same principles, as an effluent charge: "The Administrator or the State
would determine the economic value that accrued to the discharger because of its failure to
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efficient monitoring devices for all types of pollutants, and the damage
done by most pollutants is still uncertain and unquantifiable, fee calcu-
lations are likely to lack scientific substantiation and thus be suscepti-
ble to due process challenges. 107 The fee has also been criticized as a
"license to pollute" because the polluter may continue to operate
merely by paying the fee.10 8 For the present, other more traditional
and less complex methods of internalization will probably continue to
be relied upon.
The civil monetary penalty, as part of a regulatory scheme, is one
such simple and traditional method. Direct regulation in the form of
permits or administrative standards, standing alone, is generally con-
sidered to be one of the least effective methods of internalization. 109 As
one commentator has noted, however, "control by means of regulation
offers the polluter only the crudest form of economic incentive not to
pollute-the only exception being where fines imposedfor violations ex-
ceed the cost of compliance.'"I 0 The penalty is levied when an eco-
nomic unit discharges pollutants in violation of administrative orders
or permit requirements, thereby forcing the polluter to internalize the
external costs created by its polluting activities. The function of a civil
monetary penalty is similar in this respect to that of an effluent fee.
However, because the function of a monetary penalty is to deter the
polluting activity altogether, and thus not give rise to the penalty at all,
the amount of the penalty must be greater than abatement or compli-
ance costs. Because a rational, profit-maximizing economic entity will
choose the least-cost alternative when deciding how to dispose of its
pollutants, the potential polluter will invest in pollution abatement
equipment and research or comply with administrative orders only if it
is more costly to pay the penalty by not doing so.
comply with the requirements of the law. Factors to be included in this determination
would include total cost of the project, the cost of capital, and the cost of operation and
maintenance activities that would have been performed plus any other factors relevant to the
economic value of noncompliance as the guidelines published by the Administrator may
include. ... The purpose of the noncompliance fee is to correct inequities that may exist
between competitors and to take the economic benefit out of noncompliance." SENATE
COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977, S. REP. No.
370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1977). The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, on the other
hand, did establish mandatory, administratively imposed, noncompliance fees. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 7420 (West Supp. 1977). See also CoN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-6a (West Supp.
1978) and a discussion of this statute at note I11 iqfra.
107. THOMPSON, supra note 101, at 184-85.
108. Cf. EPA Civil Penalty Policy, supra note 19, at 2013 (payment of penalty does not
create a privilege to delay compliance). But see ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, supra note 101, at 151-53, which argues that a "rational" firm will
reduce its discharges if the charge is set at an appropriate level.
109. See ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, supra
note 101, at 8-18; THOMPSON, supra note 101, at 159.
110. THOMPSON, supra note 101, at 159 (emphasis added).
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The problem arises when an attempt is made to fix a uniform,
maximum amount in a penalty statute, since abatement and compli-
ance costs vary with each economic unit. For some polluters, the maxi-
mum amount will be less than their abatement or compliance costs and
they will choose to pay the penalty rather than incur greater costs to
abate or comply. Ideally, the predetermined monetary penalty would
be set according to the costs particular to each economic unit.' 1 For a
general civil-penalty statute, however, the aim is to fix the maximum
amount high enough to deter the great majority of potential polluters,
including the larger polluters. Only then can the civil monetary pen-
alty accomplish the deterrence for which it is intended. A maximum
statutory limit of $10,000 per day for each violation would appear to be
large enough to deter most polluters"12 and yet not be excessive." 3
Certainty is also an important element of any penalty that serves a
deterrence function. A potential polluter must know the amount it will
most probably be held liable for should it choose to violate pollution
control orders or discharge requirements. If there is a good chance that
an assessed penalty will be $100 rather than $10,000, or that no penalty
at all will be imposed, the efficiency of the economic deterrent is re-
duced. If it is made known that polluters will be held liable for the
maximum monetary penalty of $10,000 unless they can show mitigat-
ing circumstances,' '4 the civil monetary penalty will function best as an
111. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-6b (West Supp. 1978). This innovative statute
provides for the administrative imposition of civil penalties in a manner which attempts to
remove the economic incentives for individual polluters to delay compliance with orders and
discharge permits. The size of the penalty, imposed on a monthly basis, is determined by
estimating the cost of acquiring antipollution equipment needed by a firm and the cost of
maintaining it. The state also calculates the amount of return the company would receive if
it invested that amount of money instead of putting it toward antipoHution devices. These
penalties are different from effluent fees and pollution taxes in that the penalties are ulti-
mately imposed on only a recalcitrant few, whereas fees and taxes are paid by all discharg-
ers. See ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, supra note
101, at 54-56; Tundermann, Economic Enforcement Toolsfor Pollution Controk The Connect-
icut Plan, in POLLUTION TAXES, EFFLUENT CHARGES, AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR
POLLUTION CONTROL, supra note 104. See generally CONNECTICUT ENFORCEMENT PRO-
jEc'r, ECONOMIC LAW ENFORCEMENT (1975) (EPA).
112. But see United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 19, 60 (D. Minn.
1974), where the polluter, Reserve Mining Co., was netting $55,000-60,000 per day at one
location.
113. The capital investment in pollution control devices and facilities and subsequent
operating and maintenance expenses are generally Very costly. The Council on Environ-
mental Quality has estimated that water pollution abatement expenditures by the public and
private sectors in 1976 totaled $15.1 billion. Total annual costs are expected to increase to
$37.5 billion by 1985. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY-1977: THE EIGHH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 334 (1977).
114. For a discussion of the way in which this proposal can be implemented, see notes
151-56 & accompanying text infra.
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effective economic deterrent to polluting activites.
The Economics of Compensation
A civil monetary penalty also functions to compensate for the
damages caused by the discharge of pollutants. 1 5 Two questions are
presented: what damages are caused by water pollution and how can
they be valued so as to determine adequate compensation. Unfortu-
nately, such questions cannot be answered with scientific certainty at
this time. Quantification of biological harm is limited by the state of
technology and the availability of time, personnel, and resources. Fur-
thermore, water pollution harms the social as well as the natural envi-
ronment and any attempt to define and monetarily value pollution
damages must reckon with the inherently intangible nature of such
harm. Finally, it is questionable whether pollution damages can in fact
be reduced to monetary values. The premise of this section is that be-
cause pollution damages are so pervasive and largely unquantifiable,
attempts to place precise monetary values on each pollution incident
will tend to undervalue the actual harm done," 6 and that the real value
of the harm very often will be much greater than the statutory maxi-
mum penalty of $10,000 per day per violation.
In recent years, the amount of information about the harmful bio-
logical and ecological effects of water pollution has grown tremen-
dously.1 7 Although a detailed discussion is not possible here, a brief
115. In People v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 30, 544 P.2d 1322, 127 Cal. Rptr. 122
(1976), an action to collect civil monetary penalties under CAL. WATER CODE § 13350, the
California Supreme Court stated: "The harm caused not only to the waters themselves but to
the wildlife and marine life dependent upon them as well as its pervasive and continued
effect defies a general assessment of damages to say nothing of their calculation in terms of
money. Thus the moneys collected civilly pursuant to section 13350, subdivision (a)(3), op-
erate to more fully compensate the people of this state and are not beyond an amount
equivalent to the harm done." Id. at 37-39, 544 P.2d at 1326-27, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27.
The "nature and extent of this unquantifiable damage" is discussed in extensive footnotes to
the quoted statement. Id. at 37-39 nn.5 & 6, 544 P.2d at 1326-27, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27.
In San Francisco Civil Serv. Ass'n Local 400 v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 46, 544 P.2d
1331, 127 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1976), a penalty action under CAL. WATER CODE § 13385, the
court stated: "Since the moneys civilly collected pursuant to section 13385, like those col-
lected pursuant to section 13350, subdivision (a)(3), are paid to the State Water Pollution
Cleanup and Abatement Account, and since the water pollution proscribed by section 13385
similarly results in severe unquantifiable damage as described in People ex rel. Younger v.
Superior Court ... we concluded that the liability imposed by section 13385 fulfills the
same compensatory functions as the liability imposed by section 13350." Id. at 51, 544 P.2d
at 1335, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
116. The California Supreme Court appears to be in accord with this premise. See note
115 supra.
117. See generally 0. HERFINDAHL & A. KNEESE, QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT: AN
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO SOME PROBLEMS IN USING LAND, WATER, AND AIR 10-18 (1965).
THOMPSON, supra note 101, at 78-86; D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK WATER, WASTELAND 18-
[Vol. 30
description of these effects is useful, so that one may understand the
pervasive nature of pollution damage.
Fish and wildlife are the most obvious victims of pollutants, but as
one commentator has noted, "the problem with [water pollution] is that
most of the damage is far-reaching, long-lasting, and inconspicu-
ous."1' s The effect of pollutants on the so-called food chain is com-
monly used to demonstrate this problem:
Aquatic invertebrates feed on small organisms called plankton. The
invertebrates are in turn eaten by higher forms-fish and other ani-
mals--that are sources of food for human beings. This is, of course,
a simplified description of the awesome, precarious natural process
called the food chain, which is so delicate that the severance of any
link could ruin it. But the links are even more fragile than this.
When contaminants are passed up the food chain there is a tendency
for the poisons to concentrate in geometric orders of magnitude.
That is, relatively innocuous quantities of non-biodegradable, fat-
soluble organic pollutants concentrated in plankton-sized beings can
combine in lethal quantities in higher forms of life.1 19
Thus, one incident of pollutant discharge may have adverse effects on
the aquatic ecosystem which will be undetected for some time. Fur-
thermore, the harmful effects are not limited to the area of the receiv-
ing waters--"[T]he food chain stretches thousands of miles; distance
from the source of pollution is no guarantee of safety." 120
Harm to the social and economic environment is also potentially
far-reaching and even less understood. Swimmers, anglers, boaters,
sunbathers, and picnickers are deprived of the water's recreational uses.
Commercial fisheries and tourist operations are economically harmed.
Society at large suffers from the degradation of aesthetic quality and
must bear innumerable, additional external costs. 1 21
The damaging effects of water pollution are indeed wide ranging;
both the tiny plankton and the Sunday boater are harmed by it in one
way or another. How can a polluter ever compensate for such damage?
To be sure, fish can be restocked, beaches cleaned up, birds nursed
back to health;12 all such activites carry definite, ascertainable price
tags. Equally deserving of compensation, however, is the intangible
harm caused to society and the ecosystem in general. 123 The general
34 (1971); Kneese, Analysis of Environmental Pollution, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRON-
MENT, supra note 2, at 28-33; Walmsley, Oil dollution ProblemsArising Out ofExploitation of
the Continental Shelf- The Santa Barbara Disaster, 9 SAN DIEGo L. Rnv. 514 (1972).
118. Walmsley, Oil Pollution Problems Arising Out of Exploitation of the Continental
Shelf- The Santa Barbara Disaster, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 514, 557 (1972).
119. D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND 18 (1971).
120. Id. at 19.
121. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
122. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
123. See note 126 infra.
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law of damages requires that the amount of money paid as compensa-
tion for some harmful act be related to the pecuniary value of damage
done. Yet, as noted earlier, great difficulties are encountered when an
attempt is made to reduce the harm incurred by the discharge of pollu-
tants to monetary terms for the purpose of compensation.
The difficulty in quantifying the value of harm to the natural envi-
ronment stems from the fact that most fish, wildlife, and aquatic re-
sources are outside the traditional scope of the market economy.1 24 As
one resource economist has written:
Since fish and wildlife resources are legally considered the property
of the State and are administered as a public resource, the economic
value of these wildlife resources cannot be determined through the
normal market forces of supply and demand. These resources, re-
ferred to as extra-market goods, are not subject to the auction effect
of the market and consequently cannot be priced at the point of
equality between supply and demand ...
As a result of the non-marketable quality of our wildlife re-
sources, it is extremely difficult to place equitable value on
them. . . . The net result is considerable professional judgement and
assumptions being made to provide the necessary factors used to es-
tablish the desired damage values. 125
These subjective "judgements and assumptions" make monetary values
attributable to extra-market resources extremely manipulable and de-
pendent on the researcher's personal biases.
The state of current technology also contributes to the speculative
nature of damage assessment studies. Sampling errors, natural changes
in the environment, absence of comparison studies, variable water cur-
rents, the general lack of knowledge about the short-term and long-
term effects of pollution on fragile aquatic ecosystems, and several
other factors create a sizable margin for error in assessing the extent of
actual harm to the biological community resulting from a given pollu-
tion incident.
Even greater difficulties are encountered when valuation of intan-
gible social harm is attempted. Certainly, the aesthetic value of a pol-
lution-free lake and the recreational benefit of fishing are not "bought
and sold," and thus fixed by the ordinary market forces of supply and
demand. Yet, public policy and principles of economics demand that
the polluter pay something to compensate for the aesthetic and cultural
124. See M. Martin, An Assessment of the Impacts and Effects of the March 1974 City
and County of San Francisco Untreated Sewage Discharge 42-46 (Aug. 1977) (draft copy for
Cal. Dep't of Fish and Game) [hereinafter cited as San Francisco Untreated Sewage Dis-
charge]; F. Walgenbach, Economic Report on the Fish and Wildlife Damages Sustained at
the Big Hole Area of the Colorado River 3-5 (Sept. 21, 1973) (Cal. Dep't of Fish and Game)
[hereinafter cited as Walgenbach].
125. Walgenbach, supra note 124, at 3.
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damage which has been inflicted on society.126
Several methods are used in an effort to assign money values to
aquatic natural resources and to social activities and benefits.127 In or-
der to simplify evaluation techniques, various value categories have
been established. The most commonly used categories are replace-
ment, commercial, ecological, recreation, and psychic values. A brief
description of the methodologies used to calculate such values illus-
trates how undeveloped the "state of the art" is in this area.
The "replacement" cost of fish and wildlife resources is often used
to fix their monetary "value." For some types of fish, this is computed
on the basis of commercial hatchery production costs. This method
does have some objective economic content but it "does not account
for: (1) natural mortality to hatchery fish after release; (2) damage to
the ecosystem as [a] result of significant loss to one species; and (3)
value of species to sport or commercial fishery."'128 More significantly,
most fish, birds, and aquatic mammals are not commercially produced
and, for rare or endangered species, there simply are no replacements
to value. 129
The market price of destroyed resources is used to calculate "com-
mercial" values. This method depends on an accurate count of the de-
stroyed resource and is, of course, limited to those relatively few
resources that are actually-sold commercially. Commercial values "can
serve only as a floor or minimum basis for valuation of living resources
... , since much aquatic life with no commercial value is
destroyed .... ",130
Because knowledge of the benefits imparted to society by the
126. See text accompanying notes 101-110 supra. These payments for aesthetic and cul-
tural harm to society can be analogized to the compensatory damages imposed for tortious
infliction of mental distress and physical pain. Although such pain and suffering are also
difficult to prove and measure, the courts have long recognized that mental injuries are
deserving of redress and money damages have been allowed as compensation in such cases.
See C. McCoRMICK, DAMAGES 315,316 (1935); W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRaS 49-51 (4th ed.
1971).
127. The following overview of damage-assessment methodologies is drawn largely
from information contained in Westman, How Much Are Nature's Services Worth?, 197 Sci.
960 (1977); Wood, Requiring Polluters to PayforAquatic Natural Resources Destroyed by Oil
Pollution, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 545, 600-608 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Wood]; M.
Martin, Environmental Assessment of Discharge at Pier 98, Lash Terminal, India Basin, San
Francisco, California 50-53 (July 5, 1976) (draft copy for Cal. Dep't of Fish and Game)
[hereinafter cited as Discharge at Pier 98]; Walgenbach, supra note 124, at 6-14.
128. Discharge at Pier 98, supra note 127, at 50-51.
129. Walgenbach, supra note 124, at 8, suggests that where there is no market value, as
there is for hatchery fish, one should estimate the value of each component of "labor, capi-
tal, and materials necessary to reproduce the resource in question" in order to arrive at a
replacement cost. This, of course, ignores all social costs incurred by the loss of such
resources.
130. Wood, supra note 127, at 604.
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proper functioning of the ecosystem131 is so limited at present, the cal-
culation of "ecological" costs incurred by pollution is quite unsophisti-
cated. Estimates of ecological values are sometimes attempted by
calculating the cost of technologically duplicating the functions per-
formed by an ecosystem or the cost of repairing damaged ecosystem
functions. 132 The problem here, of course, is that most often the tech-
nology does not exist to duplicate or repair such functions and thus no
cost can be credibly calculated. As one water quality biologist cau-
tions, "[o]bviously, it is important to utilize experts with as much
knowledge [of] ecological systems as possible [in assessing ecological
damage]; however, in the final analysis, his [or her] valuation is likely
to be no more than an informed estimate."' 133
Estimates of the value of lost or reduced recreational opportunities
are calculated in various ways.134 One method is to determine the de-
cline in the number of recreational users of the waterfront area by com-
paring normal use figures with use figures gathered subsequent to the
polluting incident.135 The resulting loss of recreational user days is val-
ued by either summing the travel costs normally incurred by users in
going to and from the area or summing the average user's cost of a
recreation day.136 Not only does this system of valuation depend on
the availability of normal use figures, but it grossly underestimates the
real worth of recreational activities to the water user since it is based
solely on the average recreationalist's out-of-pocket expenses.137 Wi1l-
131. Such ecological functions include "the absorption and breakdown of pollutants, the
cycling of nutrients, the binding of soil, the degradation of organic waste, the maintenance
of a balance of gases in the air, the regulation of radiation balance and climate, the fixation
of solar energy-the functions, in short, that maintain clean air, pure water, a green earth,
and a balance of creatures . Westman, How Much Are Nature's Services Worth?, 197
Sci. 960, 961 (1977).
132. See id.
133. Discharge at Pier 98, supra note 127, at 52.
134. See generally C. BINKLEY & W. HANEMANN, THE RECREATION BENEFITS OF
WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF DAY TRIPS IN AN URBAN SETTING (1978)
(EPA, Office of Health and Ecological Effects, Office of Research and Development);
Knetsch & Davis, Comparisons of Methodsfor Recreation Evaluation, in ECONOMICS OF THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 2, at 384.
135. See San Francisco Untreated Sewage Discharge, supra note 124, at 9-10, 18-22.
136. Discharge at Pier 98, supra note 127, at 53.
137. A further problem with this method is illustrated by the following example: "[Olne
might try to get at least a minimum value of Pike Lake for recreation purposes by adding up
the expenditures made by people who visit Pike Lake on fishing and duck-shooting licenses,
guide services, boat-rentals, fishing gear, ammunition, travel and living expenses, and prob-
ably several other things. Once you have done the addition, however, it is very difficult to
know what the resulting figure means. Suppose there is another lake a hundred miles fur-
ther away that is not at present used for recreation purposes. Is its value for recreation
purposes zero? If Pike Lake became unusable, and all vacationers then travelled to the other
lake, is it not true that the only value of Pike Lake to them was the savings they used to
enjoy by not having to travel the extra 100 miles that they now travel? And if all lakes
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ingness-to-pay surveys have also been used to value the recreational
benefits yielded by unpolluted water.' 38 Survey subjects are asked how
much they would pay to receive these benefits, the accumulated results
being a measurement of recreation values. The problem here is that
most people don't know how much they would pay and their answers
are likely to be overstated or understated depending on their percep-
tions of the interviewer's motives. In addition, the validity of any sur-
vey can be questioned on the basis of its timing, sampling methods, or
wording of questions.
"Psychic" or "aesthetic" values are the most elusive values and
hence are frequently ignored in calculating the total damage caused by
a polluting incident. 39 Yet, this is usually the type of damage that af-
fects the greatest number of people; it is not limited to those who actu-
ally partake in aquatic activities. One resource economist attempted to
define the psychic value of a healthy natural environment:
The value has two sides to it which are mutually exclusive. On the
one side is the aesthetic value derived by the knowledge that some-
thing exists and is there to enjoy. The public is willing to expend
money to preserve certain natural resources, knowing full well that
they will never personally utilize that resource. On the other side of
the coin is the feeling of personal loss created by the knowledge that
something that once was, is no more. The psychic damage is the
damage to the people. This people damage is represented by the to-
tal loss to society in knowing that a natural resource is threatened.
The psychic damage is that human emotional reaction which persists
any time disaster happens. It is the genuine feeling of distress felt by
all those who have sympathy for the unfortunate objects of destruc-
tion .... 
Surveys are sometimes taken to assess the monetary value of this
psychic damage to the public, but they suffer from the same deficien-
cies described above.141 Another method of assessing psychic damage
is to multiply some value assigned to each individual who would have
knowledge of the pollution incident by the total number of such peo-
ple.' 42 The difficulty here lies in determining the amount of the as-
become unusable, and people turn from swimming to, say, folk-dancing, for their recreation,
how can anyone say how much less enjoyment they get from folk-dancing than from swim-
ming?" J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRIcEs 44-45 (1968).
138. See Broughton, Aesthetics and EnvironmentalLaw: Decisions and Values, 7 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 451, 483-84 (1972); Wood, supra note 127, at 605; J. DALES, POLLUTION,
PROPERTY & Pricns 42-43 (1968); P. Sorensen, Environmental Damage in Economics and
in Law: The Case of the Santa Barbara Oil Spill 11-12 (Nov. 19, 1976) (paper prepared for
the annual meeting of the S. Econ. Ass'n) (Dep't of Econ., Fla. St. U., Tallahassee).
139. See generally Broughton, Aesthetics and Environmental Law. Decisions and Values,
7 LAND & WATER L. REv. 451 (1972).
140. Walgenbach, supra note 124, at 9-10.
141. See text accompanying note 138 supra.
142. An example of such a technique is provided by Walgenbach, su.pra note 124, at 10:
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signed value and the number of "knowledgeable" people. The
resulting measure of psychic value under this method cannot be much
more than an educated guess, although it does demonstrate that the
value of an intangible such as this can be quite high. 43 Any other
methods'44 used to calculate psychic value also suffer from the general
inability to quantify intangibles and result in figures which are no more
than vague estimates.
There are several other benefits imparted to society by the exist-
ence of unpolluted water which have not been valued at all and are
thus completely omitted from any assessment of total pollution dam-
age. These benefits include scientific research values, undiscovered or
undeveloped values, environmental baseline and monitoring values,
and teaching values. 45 Such beneficial uses, while perhaps even less
susceptible to precise valuation than the previously enumerated in-
tangibles, are nevertheless substantial and important, and should be in-
cluded in the damage-assessment calculation.
The preceeding paragraphs have illustrated the shortcomings and
difficulties in determining the extent and value of pollution damages to
the environment and to society.146 While a complete damage assess-
ment should evaluate all losses, indirect as well as direct, limited fi-
nances, time, and overall knowledge have forced researchers to focus
on only a few values. Therefore, the monetary value of water pollutant
damage arrived at by conventional assessment methodologies does not
reflect the total amount of damages imposed on the environment and
society. The difference consists of unquantifiable but no less substan-
tial harm which, in light of the preceeding discussion, should be com-
pensated for by the polluter just as is more measureable harm.
"Assume the California Desert Bighorn Sheep were being taken illegally. This action would
seriously effect the future existence of the sheep. Assume further that only 10% of Califor-
nia's population was aware of the situation and that each one was asked to contribute I0
for the protection and preservation of the species. This would amount to a $200,000 psychic
damage value. Now, if the number of people psychologically damaged is increased or if the
meager I0 is increased, the psychic damage value will increase very rapidly. It would not
be unreasonable to expect a larger average monetary value for this damage or a larger popu-
lation being affected by the damage. The point being that the psychic damage value is a
very large and significant figure."
143. Id.
144. These methods include "shadow pricing," "attitude scaling," and calculation of a
fixed percentage of quantifiable harm as aesthetic damages. See Wood, supra note 127, at
607-08.
145. See Ehrenfeld, The Conservation of Non-Resources, 64 AM. Sci 648 (1976).
146. This is not, of course, to say that valuation methodologies are of no use. Without
the estimates derived by such methods, sensible decision-making based on analysis of the
costs and benefits of taking an action that may affect the environment would be impossible.
These estimates are also useful in that they evidence the minimum magnitude of the value
lost.
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As a result of this deficiency, if the state must rely on imperfect
assessment methodologies in order to carry the traditional burden of
proof regarding damages, the value arrived at by a trier of fact in a
civil-penalty lawsuit will often be far less than that which would truly
compensate for the damage done. This is undesirable from a public
policy perspective for at least two reasons: (1) the polluter does not
fully compensate society for all the harm it inflicts on nature and man-
kind; and (2) the polluter does not fully internalize these external costs,
thereby frustrating both the compensatory and the deterrent functions
of a monetary penalty.
Shifting the Burden of Proof
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that the current prac-
tice of allocating to the state the burden of proving facts sufficient to
support the assessment of a substantial monetary penalty may under-
mine rather than further the penalty functions of deterring a potential
polluter from discharging its pollutants and of more fully compensating
for the damages resulting from a discharge if it does occur. Because the
government is often unable to carry the burden, the amount of the pen-
alty, if any, that is finally assessed may not be greater than the pol-
luter's abatement or compliance costs nor large enough to compensate
for most of the harm, both quantifiable and unquantifiable, imposed
on the environment and society. In addition, potential polluters do not
now know with any degree of certainty the amount of the penalty that
it will most probably be liable for. Furthermore, the slight possibility
at present of a penalty action actually resulting in the imposition of a
significant penalty ensures that the penalty is no real threat to the pol-
luter's illegal activities.
For these reasons, it is proposed that a just and equitable method
of avoiding or at least minimizing these shortcomings in present pen-
alty assessment actions is to judically create apresumption that the ap-
propriate deterrence and compensation values attributable to a
polluter's activities are of an amount equal to the maximum penalty
provided for in the enforcement statute. The polluter would then have
a two-pronged burden of proving that both these values are actually
less than the maximum amount.
This proposal aids the deterrent function of the civil monetary
penalty by informing all polluters that their potential liability is a defi-
nite, predetermined amount of $10,000 per day per violation. In most
cases, this figure will be greater than the polluter's abatement or com-
pliance costs and rather than face a penalty assessment proceeding
where it must bear the cost and burden of rebutting the evidentiary
presumption, the polluter logically would find it more advantageous to
abate discharges and comply with administrative orders. The penalty's
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compensatory function is also furthered by this approach since recov-
ery is not limited to the amount of damage "proven" by conventional
assessment methodologies, which, at best, value only measurable, tan-
gible losses; 147 at least partial compensation for the real yet unquantifi-
able harm resulting from water pollution would be possible.
Furthermore, because the maximum amount of both the deterrent and
compensatory values provided for in the statute is merely the presumed
amount of the penalty appropriate both to deter future violations and
to compensate for past damages, a polluter can present factors in miti-
gation of the maximum. The polluter can thereby avoid the excessive
assessments that could result if a fixed and inflexible amount were set
by law. 148
When determining which factors the court should be permitted to
consider in mitigation of the maximum recovery, two facts must be
remembered. First, section 13385 of the California Water Code,'149 as
well as its federal counterpart 33 U.S.C. section 1319(d),' 50 is a strict
liability statute and, therefore, the polluter's intent or negligence is ir-
relevant when fixing liability.' 51 Second, the pollution incident is afait
accompli at the time mitigating factors become an issue in a judicial
assessment proceeding-in essence, the deterrent function of the civil
monetary penalty has been ineffective as it concerns the case before the
court and compensation is now the primary focus. It follows, then, that
147. See text accompanying notes 117-45 supra.
148. This proposal can be analogized to the concept of liquidated damages. Liquidated
damage provisions are included in contracts when the amount of damages caused by a
breach would be "incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation." 5 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 769, at 639 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961). See also 5 A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1060 (1964); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF DAMAGES § 148 (1935). Parties agree to such provisions in order to provide an incentive
for one party to perform (although such a motive is disfavored), to avoid costly litigation by
making proof of damages unnecessary, and to inform each party of "the extent of risk expo-
sure." Sweet, Liquidated Damages in Caifornia, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 84, 87 (1972). Courts
enforce such contract clauses because they "help the courts achieve just results. Sometimes
the computation of damages in litigation is no better than a guess; as long as the amount
selected by the parties is within a reasonable range, the courts feel that enforcing the amount
selected is likely to be as fair as any amount determined by the court." Id. at 88 (emphasis
added). In other words, the function of liquidated damages is to provide a measure of re-
covery without requiring proof of actual damages when damages may be difficult or impos-
sible to ascertain. See Rex Trailer Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); McCarthy
v. Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 297 P.2d 981 (1956). Furthermore, under a view favored by some
commentators, liquidated damages create a presumption that the stipulated amount equals
the actual loss, rebuttable upon a showing by the defendant that the loss was a lesser
amount. See, e.g., Sweet, supra, at 142-45; Note, Liquidated Damages as Prima Facie
Evidence, 51 IND. L.J. 189 (1975).
149. CAL. WATER CODE § 13385 (West Supp. 1978).
150. 33 U.S.C. 1319(d) (1976).
151. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra; cf CAL. WATER CODE § 13350 (West
Supp. 1978) (applies to intentional or negligent violations of orders and requirements).
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the court should initially attend to the compensatory value of the harm
inflicted and disregard factors bearing on the particular polluter's iden-
tity and the circumstances surrounding the violation. After all, the
harm inflicted by the discharge of 100,000 gallons of pollutants is the
same regardless of who is responsible. Only after the polluter has
shown that the compensatory value is less than the statutory maximum,
should factors going to the polluter's culpability and economic opera-
tion be considered in mitigating the presumptive deterrent value.
As a suggested method of implementing this proposal, the polluter
may first attempt to reduce the civil monetary penalty by showing that
the amount that would compensate for the pollution harm is less than
the maximum value of $10,000 per day per violation. Apart from the
above-described shortcomings in current valuation methodologies,15 2
certain factors have an obvious bearing on the "value" of pollution
harm to the environment and to society: for example, the quantity and
nature of the pollutant discharge; the length of time over which the
discharge occurs; the location of the discharge; and the success of
clean-up efforts. A consideration of these factors may warrant an ini-
tial reduction in the presumed value of $10,000 per day per violation.
Although the polluter has not been deterred in the instant case, the
deterrent function is relevant to future polluting incidents, involving
either the same polluter or other potential polluters. Therefore, once
the polluter has carried the initial burden of proving that the compen-
satory value of the harm inflicted on the environment and on society is
less than the maximum allowable recovery, the polluter must further
prove that the difference between the statutory maximum and the
proven compensatory amount is greater than the amount which would
serve to deter future pollution incidents. Factors such as the size of the
business, impossibility, third-party causation, previous violations, and,
of course, the cost of abatement or compliance to the polluter could be
considered in this regard. Allocation of the burden of proof in this
manner and consideration of these mitigating factors seeks to ensure
that, up to a maximum of $10,000 per day per violation, the State will
be compensated for pollution damage and the polluter will be moneta-
rily deterred from future violations by assessment of an amount appro-
priate to the particular polluter. 53
152. See notes 124-46 & accompanying text supra.
153. To illustrate the above method of implementation, suppose the polluter presents
convincing evidence that the environmental and social harm caused by its one-day, single-
source pollution discharge is of a value of $4,000. This amount may have been determined
by demonstrating that the quantity of discharge was not great, the pollutant was not toxic,
few or no recreational opportunities were lost or reduced, the receiving body of water was
large rather than small, etc. The polluter must then convince the trier of fact that the deter-
rent value of the particular incident relative to that polluter is less than $6,000 (the differ-
ence between the shown compensatory value of $4,000 and the statutory maximum penalty
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California courts have the power to create rebuttable presump-
tions which affect the burden of proof on a given issue when matters of
public policy and the availability of evidence so warrant.' 54 Certainly,
both public policy' 55 and principles of economics strongly favor forcing
polluters to pay for all damages they cause as well as depriving them of
economic benefits unconscionably gained. The difficulty or inability of
the state to prove the values of such damages and benefits must not be
allowed to subvert this end. Shifting the burden of proof regarding
damages and benefits from the state to the polluter is a workable, rela-
tively nondisruptive method of responding to this problem.' 56
CONCLUSION
A showing of a violation of section 13385 of the California Water
Code should give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the damage re-
sulting to the environment and society and the economic benefit accru-
ing to the polluter is of a value of $10,000 per day per violation. The
polluter would then have a burden of proving factors in mitigation of
the maximum recovery. Such treatment would serve to both deter vio-
lations of cease and desist orders and waste discharge requirements and
to more fully compensate for unquantifiable damage to the environ-
ment and society. Given the environmental policies of California, the
economic wisdom of requiring complete internalization of all pollution
costs, and the difficulties of proving the extent and monetary value of
water pollution damages, it is appropriate for the courts to shift the
burden of proof on this issue. In this way, the civil monetary penalty
provides meaningful deterrence from and compensation for the perva-
sive hazard of water pollution.
of $10,000). A showing that, despite the company's reasonable effort to secure the premises,
the illegal discharge was caused by vandals may justify the absence of any deterrent value
appropriate to the polluter. On the other hand, if the polluter could have abated the dis-
charge by investing $6,000 or more in pollution control devices, if the company has previ-
ously committed violations, or if the company's assets are large relative to $6,000, then
imposition of the maximum amount of the civil monetary penalty may be appropriate.
154. CAL. EVID. CODE § 605 (West Supp. 1978): "A presumption affecting the burden of
proof is a presumption established to implement some public policy other than to facilitate
the determination of the particular action in which the presumption is applied .... " For a
pertinent discussion of shifting the burden of proof for public policy reasons, see Environ-
mental Nuisance Cases, supra note 2, at 681-85.
155. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
156. Reallocation of the burden of proof is often urged as a subtle means of adjusting
the law to conform to changes in public policy. See Krier, EnvironmentalLitigation and the
Burden fProof, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 105 (M. Baldwin & J. Page, Jr. eds. 1970);
Leventhal, Environmental Deeisonmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv.
509, 536; Environmental Nusiance Cases, supra note 2, at 692-93.
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